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Trademarks rely on the symbolic commu-
nication between producers of goods or
services and the consuming public. The
linking of products or services to a symbol
is a fundamental value of commercial
trademark investment.' And the extent of
that value is evidenced by the growing to-
tal investment in advertising and rights
enforcement and is the focus of calls for in-
creased international harmonization of in-
tellectual property laws.2 But while the
underlying current of international har-
monization may be commercially driven,
domestic trademark laws balance com-
mercial and public interests.
On the one hand, in many domestic
trademark regimes, marks that are purely
descriptive or generic will not be registra-
ble in order to preserve free commercial
use of those words or symbols; on the other,
deceptive or misleading marks are prohib-
ited because of their harmful effect on con-
sumers. Thus, to gain exclusive use of a
mark, commercial entities seek arbitrary or
fanciful uses of words or symbols or try to
elevate descriptive words or symbols to a
secondary meaning that signifies the source
of that product or service. Effective brand-
ing through symbolic communication can
result in bountiful returns and may even at-
tain mark celebrity.
But at its core, "[slymbolic communica-
tion requires the establishment of an agreed
*Law Fellow, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Appeals & Legislation Unit. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily
represent the views or position of the City of Philadelphia. Duke University School of LawJ.D./LL.M. 2010; University of California,
Berkeley, B.A. 2006.
1 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RiclARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNosIc STRUCTURE OF INTELLECITAL PROPERTY LAw 166 (2003).
2 See Adrian Otten & Hannu Wagner, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VANo. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 393 (1996).
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vocabulary, as the transfer of information
works if there is a clear set of associations
between (external) objects and the symbols
that represent them."' In the United States,
our agreed vocabulary is a broad universe,
containing words, symbols, colors, sounds,
etc. And as a country of immigrants and
multilingual Americans, the expression of
those symbols and words is as diverse as
the modern languages around the world.
Despite the world's linguistic diversity,
certain words or descriptions are universal
or generic to the language they are ex-
pressed in. In the eleventh chapter of the
Book of Genesis, we learn that once "the
whole earth was of one language, and of
one speech."' The familiar tale tells us of
man's early attempt to construct a city and
tower of brick and stone.' But the Lord
"came down to see the city and the tower.
.. [a]nd the Lord said, Behold, the people is
one, and they have all one language; and
this they begin to do: and now nothing will
be restrained from them, which they have
imagined to do."6 And before the tower
could be built, the Lord intervened and
scattered the people across the world and
confused their tongues. The city was lost,
and the Tower of Babel crumbled into lore.
In this day, the tale of Babel reminds us
that at one time, we shared a common lan-
guage. And while several modern lan-
guages continue to confuse many
individuals, in some ways, domestic trade-
mark laws can help us overcome that con-
fusion. This paper examines one doctrine
that assists trademark examiners and
courts: the doctrine of foreign equivalents.
It should be noted that it is not the place of
the doctrine to reduce all non-English lan-
guages to a single tongue, rather, it strives
to prohibit the monopolization of certain
words or descriptions that may be shared
among languages and prevent consumer
confusion by virtue of their linguistic apti-
tude. It is argued here, that the Federal
Circuit misapplied that doctrine in Spirit In-
ternational, when it introduced a propor-
tionality requirement into the doctrine of
materiality for purposes of geographically
deceptively misdescriptive marks.
This paper begins with a discussion of
the framework of international and na-
tional trademark law that is relevant to an
analysis of non-English language marks in
the United States. Although it does not
necessarily follow that national law doc-
trines follow directly from international
agreements, the multilateral network of in-
tellectual property treaties is helpful in un-
derstanding how some provisions of
national law are congruent to international
obligations. Second, I discuss two basic
policy objectives behind the doctrine of for-
eign equivalents and explore some as-
sumptions underlying the doctrine. Then,
I introduce the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board decision, which is followed by the
Federal Circuit decision in 2009. My prin-
cipal assertions rely on traditional statu-
tory interpretation. I should note that some
of my criticisms of the Federal Circuit lie
within the description of the court's analy-
sis of case-law, but the thrust of my argu-
ment follows the general case discussion.
3 Minus van Baalen and Vincent A. A. Jansen, Common language or Tower of Babel? On the evolutionary dynamics of signals and their
meanings, 270 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOcIETY OF LoNooN: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCEs No. 1510, 69 (2003).
4 Genesis 11:1 (King James).
5 Id. at 11:3.
6 Id. at 11:5-6.
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I. The International System
& Domestic Law
The Marrakesh Declaration of 19941 af-
firmed the establishment of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), effectively
transitioning the international community
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)Y framework to the WTO sys-
tem.9 The new system included the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)0,
which represents a compromise between
developed and developing nations over
the scope of protection and terms of imple-
mentation for intellectual property rights.'
Contained therein are the obligations as-
sumed under the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property 2 , which
includes Article 6 quinquies, regulating the
protection of marks registered in a country
of the union.
Article 6 quinquies prohibits a member
country from denying domestic registra-
tion of a registered foreign mark, unless
that mark (i) infringes the rights of a third
party in the country where registration is
being claimed; (ii) is devoid of any dis-
tinctive character or is generic; or (iii) is
contrary to public order or is likely to
cause confusion." The provision is also
subject to a member country's obligations
to provide effective protection against un-
fair competition."
Because the international trading sys-
tem is premised on a system of reciprocity
and national sovereignty, members of the
WTO reserve the right to execute their ob-
ligations through domestic legislation or
judicial means." In the United States, Sec-
tion 44 of the Lanham Act 6 allows "an ap-
plicant to register a mark in the United
States based upon an application to register
the mark in a foreign country which is
7 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. The WTO is the primary
source of international trade related obligations. Because the members agreed to dispute resolution proceedings, a measure of
sovereignty is conceded to the international system. This gives the WTO agreements some bite and makes the threat of enforcement
proceedings a point of leverage.
8 GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IA, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867
U.N.T.S. 190,33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
9 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 2, iii-iv (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994).
10 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299,33 I.L.M. 81[hereinafter "TRIPS"].
11 See Jerome H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction toa Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 363, 369
(1996).
12 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (revised July 14, 1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583 24 U.S.T. 2140, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 (1967) [hereinafter "Paris Convention"]. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was one of the first
treaties covering intellectual property rights. The Paris Convention established a system of minimum standards for the protection of
patents and trademarks and requires signatories to implement effective protections against unfair competition. Articles I through 12
and Article 19 of the Paris Convention is incorporated into the WTO dispute settlement system via TRIPS Article 2.
13 Paris Convention, Art. 6 quinquies (B).
14 See Paris Convention, Art. 1Obis.
15 TRIPS, Art. 1. Member countries also have discretion to raise the level of protection and enter into regional trading agreements
as permitted under Art. XXIV of the GATT.
16 Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. [hereinafter "Lanham Act"]. In the United States, the federal law of trademarks is
popularly known as the Lanham Act.
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party to a trademark treaty with the United
States (Sec. 44(d)), or upon a registration for
the mark in that country (Sec. 44(e))." Nev-
ertheless, foreign registrants must still com-
ply with the general requirements of the
Lanham Act and be otherwise eligible un-
der U.S. law." In short, foreign marks have
access to the Lanham Act through princi-
ples of national treatment, whereby foreign
marks receive no less favorable treatment
than domestic marks.
As a result of the statutory right to entry
into the United States market, it is likely,
then, that the number of applications for
registration increased for foreign regis-
tered, non-English language marks. But
while Article 6 quinquies requires a member
country to register foreign marks "as is,"
United States trademark examiners operat-
ing under Section 44 of the Lanham Act
have refused registration of generic or
purely descriptive marks through an appli-
cation of the doctrine of foreign equiva-
lents." Though the applicable scope of the
doctrine under international law has not
been defined, the Federal Circuit observed,
"Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention,
which addresses the refusal to register
"well known" marks in other countries,
specifically mentions translation."20 How-
ever, whether the doctrine is otherwise in
conformity with international law is not
within the scope of this paper.
The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment2' outlines additional substantive ob-
ligations for its signatories, though it was
concluded prior to the establishment of
the WTO. It was signed on December 17,
1992, by the United States, Canada, and
Mexico, and entered into force on January
1, 1994.? The NAFTA was the first treaty
defining substantive requirements regard-
ing geographic indications. And for our
purposes, the NAFTA had a significant
material effect on the Lanham Act. With
respect to geographical indications, the
NAFTA language reads:
1. Each Party shall provide, in re-
spect of geographical indications,
the legal means for interested per-
sons to prevent:
(a) The use of any means in the des-
ignation or presentation of a
good that indicates or suggests
that the good in question origi-
nates in a territory, region or lo-
cality other than the true place of
origin, in a manner that misleads
the public as to the geographical
origin of the good ....
Following the entry into force of the
NAFTA, the United States amended the
Lanham Act Section 2 to preclude registra-
17 Lanham Act, § 1126.
18 See In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
19 Due to the multiplicity of official languages of the European Union, marks are not necessarily translated into a specific language.
Instead, "[piroposed marks are examined for descriptiveness simultaneously in virtually all of the languages of the community." Eric E.
Bowman, Trademark Distinctiveness in a Multilingual Context: Harmonization of the Treatment of Marks in the European Union and the United
States, 4 SAN DIEO INI'L L.J. 513, 520 (2003) (citing Taurus-Film GmbH & Co. v. OHIM, 2001 E.C.R. 11-379 (C.F.I. 2001)).
20 In re Spirits Int'l, 563 F.3d 1347, n. 5 (Fed. Cir. 2009) [hereinafter "Spirits Int'l"], (citing 2 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition § 29:4 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter "McCarthy"]).
21 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter "NAFTA").
22 John R. Renaud, How NAFTA and GATT Have Reduced Protection for Geographical Trademarks, 26 BROOKiN J. INT'L . 1097, 1108
(2001).
23 NAFTA,Art. 1712.
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tion of "primarily geographically decep-
tively misdescriptive" marks by adding
subsection (e)(3):
No trademark by which the
goods of the applicant may be dis-
tinguished from the goods of others
shall be refused registration on the
principal register on account of its
nature unless it-
(e)
Consists of a mark which (1)
when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant is merely
descriptive or deceptively misde-
scriptive of them, (2) when used on
or in connection with the goods of
the applicant is primarily geograph-
ically descriptive of them, except as
indications of regional origin may
be registrable under section 4, (3)
when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant is
primarily geographically decep-
tively misdescriptive of them, (4)
is primarily merely a surname, or
(5) comprises any matter that, as a
whole, is functional.24
This amended provision is the statutory
framework with which we are concerned.
It was enacted as a consequence of the
United States' international obligations but
is nevertheless in line with the Lanham
Act's intent and purpose. Generally, the
Lanham Act protects consumers by pro-
moting efficient commercial identification
and intends to "regulate commerce within
the control of Congress by making action-
able the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in such commerce; ... [and] provide
rights and remedies stipulated by treaties
and conventions respecting trademarks,
trade names, and unfair competition en-
tered into between the United States and
foreign nations."" While these treaties are
not self-executing in United States law, it is
evident that they provide legislative moti-
vation or inspiration for provisions in the
Lanham Act. Nevertheless, it is a matter
for the courts to say what the law is.26
II. An Overview of the
Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents
The doctrine of foreign equivalents is a flex-
ible tool developed by the judiciary. Under
the doctrine of foreign equivalents, words
from a modern foreign language" may be
translated into English to assist trademark
examiners in determining genericness, de-
scriptiveness, and similarity of connotation
in order to ascertain confusing similarity
with English word marks.' For foreign
24 Lanham Act, § 1052 (emphasis added).
25 Lanham Act, § 1127.
26 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.").
27 The doctrine of foreign equivalents is generally restricted to modem and not obscure languages. "Foreign words from dead
languages such as Classical Greek, or from obscure languages such as those of the Hottentots or Patagonians, the Taino Indians of the
Dominican Republic, or the Native American Miwok tribe, might be so unfamiliar to any significant segment of the American buying
public that they should not be translated into English for descriptive purposes." McCarthy, § 11:34 (citations omitted). The list of
modem languages is not exhaustive but includes: Chinese, French, German, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Polish, Russian, Serbian,
Spanish, and Yiddish. See id.
28 Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Cicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772,396 F.3d 1369,1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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generic words, there are two policies un-
derlying the use of the doctrine of foreign
equivalents.29 First, the purpose of the rule
is to protect the perceptions of ordinary
multilingual Americans." Second, "foreign
generic names should not be given trade-
mark status in the United States as a mat-
ter of international comity, regardless of
whether any U.S. customers know of the
term's generic significance." 31 These two
policies are not limited to the field of
generic words but may also justify use of
the doctrine for examinations involving de-
scriptiveness, likelihood of confusion, and
as I argue, geographic misdescription.
A. Protection of
Multilingual Americans
Because some marks used in the United
States may contain non-English words, the
doctrine of foreign equivalents presumes
"that a word in one of the common, mod-
ern languages of the world will be spoken
or understood by an appreciable number of
U.S. consumers for the product or service at
issue.'"32 Although English is the domi-
nant language of the United States, many
citizens speak or understand another mod-
ern language, and the doctrine aims to pro-
tect the perceptions of those individuals.
The Second Circuit explained in
Otokoyama Co.:
[that] there are (or someday will be)
customers in the United States who
speak that foreign language. Be-
cause of the diversity of the popula-
tion of the United States, coupled
with temporary visitors, all of
whom are part of the United States
marketplace, commerce in the
United States utilizes innumerable
foreign languages."
The assumption is that for the modern
languages of the world, there are a signifi-
cant number of customers in the United
States who will understand the meaning of
a term expressed in that non-English lan-
guage.' Thus the doctrine is a flexible tool
that adjusts to the fluctuating identities
comprising the consuming public.
Nevertheless, courts recognize that the
doctrine of foreign equivalents is not an
absolute rule." The doctrine should be
applied only when circumstances suggest
that the ordinary American purchaser
would stop and translate the word into its
English equivalent. 6 In one case the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ac-
29 See Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999) ("This rule protects the interest of the
consuming public in understanding the nature of goods offered for sale, as well as a fair marketplace among competitors by insuring
that every provider may refer to his goods as what they are.").
30 McCarthy, § 12:41.
31 Id.
32 Spirits Int'l (quoting In re Spirits Infl N.V., 2008 T'AB LEXIS 6 at 22,86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1078 (T.T.A.B. 2008) [hereinafter "Spirits-
TTAB"l).
33 Otokoyama, 270-271.
34 McCarthy, § 12:41.
35 See Palm Bay at 1377 (finding that it is improbably that the average American purchaser would stop and translate the French
word "VEUVE" into "widow").
36 See McCarthy, § 12:41.
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cepted that "[t]here is no doubt, as appli-
cant's expert indicated, that to the average
American KABA will have no particular
significance other than as a trademark for
applicant's goods."" But the inquiry did
not stop there.
In applying the doctrine, the Board
confined its analysis to the relevant
group of consumers that speak or
understand the mark in the original
language. It made clear that, we
must concern ourselves with that
segment of the purchasing public
which is familiar with the Cyrillic
writing system and/or with Serbian,
Ukrainian, or other Slavic languages
using this system . ... [To these
persons, KABA, as applied to appli-
cant's goods which include coffee,
will have no other meaning.'
Defining the relevant group of con-
sumers proves to be the critical determin-
ing factor in analyzing the effect of a
non-English mark, as I will discuss in
greater detail following the discussion of
the Federal Circuit opinion.
B. Policy of International
Comity and Free Trade
Free trade in an integrated world economy
"requires the free competitive use in all na-
tions of the generic names of goods in any
language."" If United States producers
want to prohibit the registration of a
generic English word in a non-English
speaking country, principles of reciprocity
and international comity would require
that the United States not permit registra-
tion of foreign generic words."
Under a free trade policy and interna-
tional comity, a non-English generic term
could still be found unregistrable, "even if
it would not be perceived by multi-lin-
gual U.S. customers as a generic name."41
In 2000, the Fifth Circuit explicitly em-
braced the policy of free international
trade, explaining:
[Tihe policy of international comity
has substantial weight in this situ-
ation. If we permit [plaintiff]
Chupa Chups to monopolize the
term "Chupa," we will impede
other Mexican candy makers abil-
ity to compete effectively in the
U.S. lollipop market. Just as we do
not expect Mexico to interfere with
Tootsie's ability to market its prod-
uct in Mexico by granting trade-
mark protection to the word 'pop'
to another American confectioner,
so we cannot justify debilitating
[defendant's] attempts to market
"Chupa Gurts" in the United States
by sanctioning [plaintiff] Chupa
Chups' bid for trademark protec-
tion in the word "chupa."42
Granting an importer the exclusive right
to a generic or descriptive word would ef-
37 In re Hag Aktiengesellschaft, 155 U.S.P.Q. 598, 599-600 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
38 Id.
39 McCarthy, § 12:41, n.12 (citing J. Lightman, Protection of Generic Words Against Trademark Registration Abroad, 54 TRADEMARK RFFR.
80(1964).
40 Id.
41 McCarthy, § 12:41.
42 Id. (quoting Enrique Bernat F, S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439,445 (5th Cir. 2000).)
VOL 93, NO 1I 63
JONATHAN SKINNER
fectively embargo similar goods from en-
tering the United States and "give that im-
porter a competitive advantage that the
law of trademark should not allow." 3 "No
merchant may obtain the exclusive right
over a trademark designation if that exclu-
sivity would prevent competitors from des-
ignating a product as what it is in the
foreign language their customers know
best."" However, application of the doc-
trine of foreign equivalents for purposes
of international comity and free trade is
complicated by a court's interpretation of
the genericness test and its framing of "the
relevant public.""5
Although the doctrine of foreign equiv-
alents is primarily aimed at marks that are
generic or merely descriptive, or for analyz-
ing likelihood of confusion, the doctrine
may also be applied to non-English lan-
guage geographic marks."
Ill. A Brief History of
Moskovskaya Vodka and
The Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board
"Moskovskaya (Moscow vodka) with a
small epithet osobaya (special) appeared
as a patented trademark in 1894, and was
seemingly the first brand to claim the
[mark] . .. .."4 As one of the oldest vodkas
still in existence, it has its roots in the na-
tional wine monopoly operating from 1894-
1914.41 By the Soviet era (1924), the vodka
became known as the "Moscow special"
and was owned by State enterprises.
Around that time, baking soda and acetic
acid were added to the traditional vodka
mixture.o During the "Great Patriotic
War," commonly known as the Eastern
Front of World War II, the notation "spe-
cial" was dropped from the mark." It was
also affixed with a green label, for which it
is still known.52
43 Orto Conserviera Cameranese d Giacchetti Marino & C. s.n.c. v. Bioconserve, s.r.l., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013, 1999 WL 47258 (S.D.N.Y
1999), judgment aff'd, 205 F3d 1324 (2d Cir. 2000).
44 Otokoyana at 271.
45 As an act of Congress, the Lanham Act is restrained to uses in commerce. It could be argued, then, that the relevant public would
denote only the United States public. See McCarthy, § 12:41, n. 19.
46 See, e.g., Spirits-TTAB, 9-10 (citing In re joint-Stock Co., 2006 TTAB LEXIS 196, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (T.T.A.B. 2006) (Baikalskaya,
translated as "from Baikal," is primarily geographically descriptive of vodka from Lake Baikal)).
47 NICHOLAS ERMOCHKINE & PErER IGLIKOwSKI, 40 DECREEs EAsT AN ANATOMY OF VODKA 123 (Susan Boriotti et al. eds., Nova Science
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In 1997, Russian businessman Yury She-
fler acquired a brand ownership company.
Over a span of eight years and through ag-
gressive corporate acquisitions, he formed
Spirits International B.V. (SPI) and acquired
the rights to the Moskovskaya mark
through consolidation of a "disparate group
of formerly state-owned companies operat-
ing in Russia and the Baltic states." Today,
SPI describes its product as "one of the lead-
ing international vodka brands . . , ."I
In 1993, Spirits International N.V. (pre-
cursor to Spirits International B.V.) filed an
application to register the mark
MOSKOVSKAYA for its Russian made
vodka. The application was originally re-
fused registration but "suspended on
March 28, 1994 pending disposition of a
number of earlier-filed applications that
were potential citations under Section 2(d)
... against the involved application."' Pro-
ceedings resumed in 2006, at which time a
trademark examiner refused registration
under Section 2(e)(3) for the mark
MOSKOVSKAYA on the ground that the
mark is primarily geographically decep-
tively midescriptive as applied to vodka
that was not produced, manufactured or
sold in Moscow, Russia. The examiner
found and the applicant conceded "that
MOSKOVSKAYA is the adjectival form of
the word 'Moscow,' or in Russian, meaning
'of or from Moscow.""' The applicant also
stated that the vodka would not have any
connection with Moscow.'
The applicant appealed the examiner's
rejection to the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, arguing that the examiner misap-
plied the doctrine of foreign equivalents.
The Board noted that "[alithough the doc-
trine most often arises in cases involving
likelihood of confusion and marks that are
generic or merely descriptive, the doctrine
also applies to issues concerning geo-
graphic marks."59 According to the test,
"the doctrine should be applied when it is
likely that the ordinary American pur-
chaser would 'stop and translate [the term]
into its English equivalent.'""
The Board explained that the relevant
group for analysis under the doctrine of
foreign equivalents centers on the relevant
consumer who speaks or understands the
non-English language. The impetus of the
doctrine, it explained, is the extension of
the Lanham Act's protective purpose to
consumers in the country who speak other
languages in addition to English."1 The ap-
plicant attempted to define the relevant or-
dinary purchaser as an average American
purchaser, no more knowledgeable in a
non-English language than his neighbor.
But the Board argued that to adopt the ap-
plicant's definition "would undermine the
principle on which the doctrine of foreign
equivalents is based ... [and] would permit
53 See SPI Group, http://www.spi-group.com/about-spi-group/history (last visited December 15, 2009) (S.P.I. Group was founded
in 1997 by chairman Yury Shefler).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See Spirits-TTAB at 3.
57 Id. at 6.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 9-10.
60 Id. at 11 (citing Palm Bay at 1376 (quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 U.S.P.Q. 109, 110 (T.T.A.B. 1976))).
61 Id. at 16.
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or even encourage registration of foreign
terms which have the potential to deceive
an appreciable segment of the relevant con-
sumers in the United States."62 Accord-
ingly, because the ordinary Russian
speaking American purchaser would un-
derstand the mark to mean "of or from
Moscow," and by inference, "in view of
the strong connection between vodka and
Moscow, ] purchasers are likely to be de-
ceived into believing that the applicant's
vodka will come from Moscow when in
fact it will not."' Registration of the mark
was therefore denied.
IV. The Appeal to the
Federal Circuit
Following the Board's rejection of Spirits
International N.V.'s registration applica-
tion, Spirits International N.V. became SPI.
The applicant appealed the Board's finding
to the Federal Circuit in 2008. The court
agreed with the Board's application of the
doctrine of foreign equivalence, but it ex-
plained that the doctrine contains a thresh-
old limitation and only applies "in those
situations where the ordinary American
consumer would stop and translate the
mark into English."'
While the doctrine may be useful and
generally applicable, it "is not an absolute
rule and should be viewed merely as a
guideline."' Where the ordinary American
consumer who speaks the non-English lan-
guage would not translate the non-Eng-
lish mark into English, the doctrine should
not be applied. "[Tihere are foreign ex-
pressions that even those familiar with the
language will not translate, accepting the
term as it is .. . ."" The inquiry is primarily
contextual. Rather than automatically
translating the mark into English, the
marks are grounded in the situation in
which they would be naturally found. As
the Board stated in Tia Maria:
it is difficult to perceive that a person
who had purchased "AUNT
MARY'S" canned fruits and vegeta-
bles on the shelves of a supermarket
would, upon dining at the "TIA
MARIA" restaurant in Mexican decor
and surrounded by a menu of Mexi-
can delicacies, translate "TIA
MARIA" into "AUNT MARY" and
then mistakenly assume that the "TIA
MARIA" restaurant and "AUNT
MARY'S" canned fruits and vegeta-
bles originate from or are sponsored
by the same entity. This stretches a
person's credulity much too far."7
However, despite the court's lengthy at-
tention to this limitation, the court noted
that the applicant did not assert that the
"specific context of the mark is such than
an ordinary American purchaser suffi-
ciently familiar with Russian would
nonetheless take the mark at face value."'
The court then reasoned that once "the
word or phrase is translated, its impact
must be 'material' under subsection (e)(3)."
And because subsection (e)(3) was added
62 See Spirits-TTAB at 17.
63 Id. at 28.
64 Spirits Int'l at 1351.
65 Id. at 1352 (quoting Palm Bay at 1377).
66 Spirits Int'l at 1352 (quoting In re Ta Maria, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 524, 525-26 (T.T.A.B. 1975)).
67 Tia Maria at 526.
68 Spirits Int'l at 1352.
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as a result of the NAFTA Implementation
Act, the Court described a brief history of
the section.
Previously, the PTO could easily deny
registration on the principal register to ge-
ographical deceptively misdescriptive
marks.' The NAFTA Act amended Lan-
ham Act subsection (e)(2) to remove any
mention of primarily geographically de-
ceptively misdescriptive marks and cre-
ated a new subsection (e)(3) to specifically
deal with primarily geographically decep-
tively misdescriptive marks.70 As the court
observed, "Congress implicitly added a
requirement that the PTO establish that
the misdescription materially affect the
public's decision to purchase the goods."'
Though subsection (e)(3) does not ex-
pressly state that the mark may not mate-
rially deceive a substantial portion of the
relevant consuming public, the court re-
ferred to the materiality tests developed
under Lanham Act 1052(a), which bars
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous marks
as described in California Innovations. In
interpreting this subsection, the Federal
Circuit explained "that the appropriate in-
quiry for materiality purposes is whether
a substantial portion of the relevant con-
sumers is likely to be deceived, not
whether any absolute number or particu-
lar segment of the relevant consumers
(such as foreign language speakers) is
likely to be deceived." 72
In California Innovations, the Federal Cir-
cuit explained that because subsection
(e)(3) is "subject to permanent denial of
registration, the PTO may not simply rely
on lack of distinctiveness to deny registra-
tion, but must make the more difficult
showing of public deception."7 In that
case, the court warned that "[al mere infer-
ence ... is not enough to establish the de-
ceptiveness that brings the harsh
consequence of non- registrability under
the amended Lanham Act. As noted,
NAFTA and the amended Lanham Act
place an emphasis on actual misleading of
the public." The three-prong test laid out
by the Federal Circuit in California Innova-
tions states that the PTO must deny regis-
tration under Section 2(e)(3) if:
(1) the primary significance of the
mark is a generally known geo-
graphic location;
(2) the consuming public is likely to
believe the place identified by the
mark indicates the origin of the
goods bearing the mark, when in
fact the goods do not come from
that place; and
(3) the misrepresentation was a ma-
terial factor in the consumer's de-
cision.,
69 Id. at 1353 (citing In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
70 See supra Part 1.
71 Spirits Int'l at 1353 (citing Cal. Innovations, 1339-40). However, some scholars argue that the "Federal Circuit's interpretation of
the NAFIA amendments to [Slection 2 of the Lanham Act may be contrary to the legislative intent underlying those amendments."
Mary LaFrance, Innovations Palpitations: The Confusing Status of Geographically Misdescriptive Trademarks, 12 J. INTELL. PRoP. L. 125, 126
(2004).
72 Spirits Int'l at 1353.
73 Cal. Innovations at 1340.
74 Id. at 1340.
75 Id. at 1341.
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Though the Federal Circuit in California
Innovations did not make a finding on the
third prong of the test, the language clearly
states that the misrepresentation must have
been a material factor to a single con-
sumer's decision. The court did not ad-
dress the substantial portion test that the
Federal Circuit now relies on and has read
into the third prong of the original test.
The court also reasoned that the prohibi-
tion of deceptive marks codified in Lan-
ham Act Section 43(a) can be traced back to
common law standards of unfair competi-
tion. Embodied in equitable doctrines at
common law, deceptive acts would not give
rise to property value or exclusive rights."6
However, courts limited the common law
doctrine to instances of material effect, with
some courts requiring that there be proof of
a "tendency to deceive a substantial portion
of the intended audience [and] that the de-
ception is material in that it is likely to influ-
ence purchasing decisions.""' But the
substantial portion analysis is a judgment of
proportionality and not of material effect.
Material effect is limited to a single ordinary
consumer's reaction to the deceptive act,
whereas proportionality measures the cu-
mulative impact of the material effect on a
group of consumers.
As applied to the case at hand, the court
acknowledged that "the Board properly
recognized that in order to be deceptive,
foreign language marks must meet the re-
quirement that 'an appreciable number of
consumers for the goods or services at issue
will be deceived.'"" However, the court
reasoned that the Board improperly re-
jected a proportionality analysis when it
"failed to consider whether Russian speak-
ers were a 'substantial portion of the in-
tended audience.'"" The court observed
that only 0.25% of the U.S. population
speaks Russian and that one quarter of one
percent of the relevant consumers would
not be a substantial portion of the intended
audience. The case was remanded to the
Board to apply the proportionality test as
described by the court.
V. The Federal Circuit Reliance
on Materiality Imported from
Section 43(a)
Though the Supreme Court has recognized
that provisions dealing with registration
and infringement could be construed to-
gether, it has not held that the two must be
read in the same capacity. In Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court quoted its
decision from Two Pesos, Inc., stating that
"the general principles qualifying a mark
for registration under [Section] 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applica-
ble in determining whether an unregistered
mark is entitled to protection under [Sec-
tion] 43(a)."'"0 To determine whether a
mark is indeed subject to protection under
the Lanham Act, it is reasonable to analo-
gize the eligibility requirements of Section
2 and Section 43(a). It would be peculiar
for a mark to satisfy Section 2 registration
76 See Worden & Co. v. Cal. Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 528 (1903).
77 Spirits Int'l at 1355 (quoting Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F3d 125,
129-30 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that there must be proof that "at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience
[and] that the deception is material in that it is likely to influence purchasing decisions.")).
78 Spirits Int'l at 1357 (citing Spirits-TTAB at 1085).
79 Spirits Int'l at 1357.
80 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. V. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768
(1992)).
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requirements but fail to qualify for protec-
tion under Section 43(a). Here, however,
the test for denying registration need not
require the higher standard associated with
determining likelihood of confusion.
Prohibiting the registration of
MOSKOVSKAYA under Section 2, does not
prohibit its use to identify a good or serv-
ice. If the mark is used in commerce, it
would still be subject to Section 43(a) unfair
competition actions, which contains the
proportionality and materiality tests for de-
ception. Under Section 43(a), it would be
proper to look to the relevant consuming
public and rely on the cases, which require
that a substantial portion of the audience be
deceived. Within that rubric, if Russian
speakers represent a minority of the actual
consumers, the mark would not be gener-
ally deceptive and result in liability or be
prohibited from use in commerce.
Nevertheless, the court inferred that sub-
section (e)(3) requires proportional materi-
ality-that a significant portion of the
relevant consuming public be deceived-
and defined the relevant population as "the
entire U.S. population interested in pur-
chasing the product or service.""
VI. Absurd Results, Perverse
Incentives and the Protection
of Multilingual Americans
Even if courts continue to apply the same
test of proportional materiality to Section 2
as transported from Section 43(a), the Fed-
eral Circuit's application of the test has the
potential to result in otherwise disparate
treatment of marks based solely on the lan-
guage of the mark. If an English language
mark read "from Moscow" brand vodka, it
seems certain that the mark would fail the
materiality test and not be registrable. But
if the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
finds that the predominant consumer
group of MOSKOVSKAYA Russian vodka
is English speaking college students, SPI
will retain exclusive use of its mark and
may even preclude the registration of
"from Moscow" brand vodka based on the
doctrine of foreign equivalents.
Moreover, as the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board warned, the Federal Cir-
cuit's ruling may even encourage the reg-
istration of deceptive foreign language
marks, so long as those marks are targeted
at English speaking consumers.82 This
would have the effect of prejudicing those
individuals that do speak the non-English
language even though collectively they
are not a "substantial portion" of the con-
suming public by virtue of being a minor-
ity population.
To avoid that prejudicial effect, the ma-
teriality doctrine should be analyzed in
the context of the doctrine of foreign equiv-
alents. Given the underlying assumptions
of the doctrine of foreign equivalents as
discussed above, the relevant audience
should be limited to those individuals that
understand and would translate the non-
English mark. Once the relevant group is
identified, courts should determine
whether a substantial portion of that group
would be deceived by the use of the mark.
This would ensure that those individuals
that do speak a modern non-English lan-
guage would still be protected from mis-
leading marks, despite not being the
intended audience.
Even if the Federal Circuit does not ap-
ply the three-prong test as described in Cal-
81 Spirits Int'l at 1356.
82 Spirits-TTAB at 17.
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ifornia Innovations, the relevant consumer
group should be attentively defined when
determining the harmful material effect of
a non-English language mark.
Allowing deceptively misdescriptive
non-English marks to survive subsection
(e)(3) scrutiny by virtue of a minority pop-
ulation has perverse incentives for non-
English language mark registrants.
Scientific studies explain that:
[w]hen communicators have an
identical stake in the success of in-
formation transfer, natural selection
will favour the evolution of com-
munication channels that convey
messages as efficiently and unam-
biguously as possible (Krebs &
Dawkins 1984; Noble 1999). How-
ever, it is less clear what will hap-
pen when the interest of sender and
receiver do not fully overlap, be-
cause then sender and receiver need
not necessarily 'agree' about what
the signal means (Godfray 1991;
Johnstone & Grafen 1992; Gragen
& Johnstone 1993; Maynard Smith
1994; Noble 1999, 2000; Grassley et
al. 2000; Lachmann et al. 2000,2001;
Noble et al. 2001)."83
This area of miscommunication fits
squarely within the doctrine of materiality.
Where a mark miscommunicates but does
not materially effect a substantial number
of receivers, the mark may be deemed
harmless and registratble." The report
warns that "[blecause individuals in any
interaction almost inevitably have diverg-
ing interests (Van Baalen & Jansen 2001)[,]
selfish usage of signals may therefore lead
to the erosion of the meaning of signals
(Grassly et al. 2000)."1
The same study reasons that "[w]hen in-
dividuals interact with individuals taken at
random from the entire population cheat-
ing is the only evolutionary stable strat-
egy."" In the arena of international trade,
where the senders and receivers may be on
different continents and never directly in-
teract, the likelihood of cheating rises dra-
matically. Of course, recurring interactions
might diminish that likelihood; still, it
would probably not disappear altogether
and ultimately have negative effects on
marketplace confidence and impact inter-
national trade. "This process could thus
lead to the unstable coexistence of signal-
ing strategies. Then, the dynamics of the
meaning of a suite of signals will fluctuate,
and symbols may continuously acquire
and lose meaning, reflecting the dynamics
of honest use and cheating in the system.""
If the underlying purpose of the doc-
trine of foreign equivalents is to be pre-
served, and in conjunction with the explicit
purpose of the Lanham Act to prevent de-
ceptive behavior, non-English marks
should not be registrable if they result in
material deception to consumers who may
translate the mark.
83 van Baalen, supra note 3.
84 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143,144-47 (1920).
85 van Baalen, supra note 3.
86 Id. at 70.




As American trademark law continues to
develop, it should reflect the diversity of
the United States and be mindful of differ-
ent classes of ordinary consumers. This
paper argues that the doctrine of foreign
equivalents should be readily integrated
for purposes of geographic misdescriptive
marks in light of its underlying assump-
tions and the protective policies it sup-
ports. To the extent that trademark law
values efficient communication between
consumers and mark users, the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of subsection (e)(3)
leads to an erosion of that link. If the Lan-
ham Act does not seek to reward deceptive
behavior, disparate treatment of similar
marks differentiated only by virtue of a
confusion of tongues, Congress should ei-
ther explicitly define the test for decep-
tively misdescription or courts should not
be wary to apply the doctrine of foreign
equivalents as intended.
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